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From bling to breadth: making the luxury boom durable

Today’s consumer economy looks barbelled. In America, newly revised data show the top 10% now account for about half of all spending—a record share—so asset prices, not the jobless rate, are the better near‑term demand gauge. 

China’s picture is the mirror image. Prestige supply keeps arriving—from hutong courtyards at Mandarin Oriental Qianmen to Ritz‑Carlton Reserve in Jiuzhaigou—even as broad‑based demand repairs only slowly and fine‑dining outliers exit. The national pipeline remains heavy at the top end. 

1) The economics of a prestige‑skew

Three forces explain the pattern.

Wealth effects and Engel curves. At high incomes, spending tilts toward experiences and services; when equity and housing values rise, the wealth effect underwrites premium travel, dining and branded services. US resilience since 2022 has therefore been income‑ and wealth‑skewed, as Fed and card‑data work shows. But this makes consumption more cyclical with asset markets than with payrolls. 

Positional goods and scarcity premiums. Much of luxury hospitality is “positional” (value derives from status and scarcity). Prices can behave like Veblen goods (demand sustained at higher prices if signalling value endures). This supports rate power—until look‑alike supply erodes scarcity and occupancy.

Capital reallocation under constraint. In China, a property hangover, low deposit rates and outbound frictions have channelled capital into trophy hospitality and heritage conversions. Households, meanwhile, hold record deposits—a brake on discretionary F&B and mid‑market travel. The result is top‑heavy supply meeting cautious breadth. 

2) Macro outlook, 2025–26

United States. The OECD projects growth slowing from 2024 to around 1.8% in 2025, with tariffs and softer labour markets weighing. In such a regime, the concentration of spend among the top decile raises sensitivity to market swings. 

China. Baseline growth ~4.9% in 2025 fades to ~4.4% in 2026 as front‑loading and fiscal support ebb. Policy is leaning harder into services consumption (tourism, culture, health) and trade‑in subsidies for durables; helpful for near‑term outlays, less so for durable breadth unless household confidence improves. 

Hospitality read‑across. China’s hotel pipeline is 3,733 projects / 672k rooms (Q2‑2025), including 257 luxury—ample capacity. STR’s 2025 reads point to bumpy RevPAR with occupancy soft patches where new keys land. Scarcity‑anchored assets hold up; me‑too flags struggle. 

3) Strategies that survive the cycle

A. Economics for policymakers (breadth before bling)

  • US—reduce wealth‑effect fragility. When half of consumption sits with the top decile, stabilisers matter. Prioritise automatic, targeted tax credits (eg, child and earned‑income) that phase up in downturns; they support the broad marginal propensity to consume without blunt cheques. The goal is not to clip premium margins but to widen the base feeding them. (Context: high‑income spending still leads; asset‑led cycles dominate.)  
  • China—re‑weight policy toward households and trust. Keep services‑consumption support but redirect more fiscal firepower to household balance‑sheets and clear consumer‑protection rules. New Implementing Rules of the Consumer Law (effective 1 July 2024) and 2025 Supreme People’s Court guidance on prepaid consumption are steps forward; consistent enforcement raises willingness to prepay for experiences beyond theme‑park IP.  

B. Strategy for firms and investors (occupancy beats opulence)

  • From barbell to ladder. Replace two‑tier offers with a three‑rung structure—flagship premium, “almost‑premium” (club‑lite floors; premium‑economy seats), and refined core. This protects top‑end rate while broadening volume. (Airlines show the template: in 2024, premium+loyalty contributed ~57% of Delta revenue, with premium outpacing main cabin.)  
  • Supply discipline and conversions. In China’s leading cities, favour conversions and soft brands over new luxury builds. With 257 luxury projects already in the pipeline, incremental keys should target upper‑midscale/upper‑upscale segments with broader utilisation. Track RevPAR [room revenue per available room] and occupancy by submarket; if occupancy drops >2 ppts as keys rise, delay opening or convert.  
  • Membership that earns trust, not float. Prepaid failures in fitness left scars; the credible model is benefit‑guaranteed access backed by strong IP [intellectual property] and immediate delivery. Club 33 (Shanghai Disneyland’s private members’ club) works because value is concrete (exclusive dining, events) and realised now. If taking advance funds, escrow them and tie benefits to visible, capacity‑constrained assets (chef’s‑counter allocations; private galleries; timed fireworks platforms under licensing).  
  • Remote‑destination economics. For out‑of‑the‑way luxury (reserves, heritage sites), design networked itineraries (rail‑and‑stay circuits) and length‑of‑stay guarantees. What matters is stay depth and repeats, not peak‑night ADR.
  • Operating resilience. Digitise low‑value touchpoints and reallocate labour to “wow” moments; price for shoulder nights (fenced advance purchase; local‑resident privileges) rather than only weekends. STR’s weekly splits show luxury can hold RevPAR through rate—but occupancy softness is the margin killer.  

4) What the emblematic assets really teach

Mandarin Oriental Qianmen (Beijing) and Ritz‑Carlton Reserve (Jiuzhaigou) show that scarcity with story can justify top‑end pricing; Amanfayun (Hangzhou) and Amandayan (Lijiang) show the value of rooted heritage over flashy duplication. The lesson is not “build more icons”, but protect scarcity, avoid clones, and broaden the ladder beneath. 

5) A simple scorecard to run each quarter

  • US: Track top‑decile spend share versus equity drawdowns; stress‑test a 10% market fall on premium volumes.  
  • China: Pair openings with RevPAR/occupancy by city; pre‑commit to pause or convert if two consecutive quarters show occupancy down and keys up.  
  • Trust: Monitor complaints and refunds on prepaid schemes; enforce escrow and “benefits now” rules where possible.  

By the numbers

  • 49.2% — US consumer‑spend share by the top 10% (2025).  
  • 1.8% / 4.9% — OECD 2025 GDP growth forecasts for the US / China.  
  • 3,733 / 672,224 — China’s hotel pipeline (projects/rooms) at Q2‑2025; 257 in luxury.  
  • >160 trillion yuan — Chinese household deposits, underscoring caution.  
  • 57% — Delta revenue from premium + loyalty in 2024 (sign of a premium ladder).  

Sources (select)

  • Washington Post (Sep 26 2025): Top decile ≈ 49.2% of US spending (post‑revision).  
  • Boston Fed (Aug 13 2025): High‑income spending has remained resilient since 2022.  
  • OECD Interim Outlook (Sep 2025): US 1.8%, China 4.9% growth in 2025 (pdf).  
  • Lodging Econometrics (Aug 7 2025): China pipeline 3,733 projects / 672k rooms; 257 luxury.  
  • Reuters (May 27 2025): Chinese household deposits >160 trn yuan.  

Additional in‑text sources (cited above): STR weekly insights on occupancy/RevPAR; Club 33 official page (Shanghai); MO Qianmen and Ritz‑Carlton Reserve press/brand pages; Delta investor materials. 

Kicker

Prestige is a fine business. It becomes a strong economy only when scarcity at the top sits on confidence and breadth below.

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The Missing Stall: How China’s tidy‑up of street commerce dulled demand

When Shanghai’s Menghua Street Wonton reopened in 2017, it took a nudge from the very top. The hole‑in‑the‑wall shop had been shuttered for licensing issues, then given a second life after Premier Li Keqiang publicly backed its return—an emblem of how policy can either snuff out or revive the small, cash‑intensive businesses that lubricate urban spending. 

Beijing: bricking up vitality

In 2017 Beijing set out to “seal holes in the wall”—blocking illegal doors and windows that let thousands of tiny shops and cafes trade directly onto the street. The plan targeted some 16,000 such openings, gutting hutong micro‑retail in places like Fangjia Hutong almost overnight. 

The campaign dovetailed with a broader push to “relieve non‑capital functions,” which shut or expelled wholesale markets and informal clusters that served, employed, and were often owned by migrant workers. The once‑bustling Zoo and Dahongmen clothing markets were closed and traders pushed to Yanjiao, Cangzhou, and other sites in Hebei and Tianjin—far from their customer base and city footfall. 

After a deadly apartment fire in Daxing, authorities also launched a 40‑day “cleanup” that evicted tens of thousands of migrants—many running small shops or working in low‑tier services—hardening a shift away from street‑level commerce and cheap services that underpin everyday consumption. 

Shanghai: from “bald chickens” to designer conformity

Shanghai pursued a parallel project of visual order. A signboard rectification drive stripped storefronts into uniform black‑and‑white fascia on certain streets, prompting locals to grumble that once‑lively blocks now looked like a row of “bald chickens.” The city later softened the rules, but the instinct remains: standardize aesthetics, centralize control. 

From alleys to atriums

The logic behind “tidy‑up” has often been to channel trade into managed spaces—indoor markets and malls—where compliance is easier to monitor and fire codes easier to enforce. Beijing’s open‑air Silk Street was famously moved into an indoor mall back in 2005; variants of that model have since proliferated. 

The economic costs are real. When street vendors are evicted, local fruit and vegetable prices rise—by about 4.7% on average, according to city‑level evidence on the impact of chengguan enforcement—eroding consumers’ purchasing power and thinning the very margins that keep low‑income households spending. 

The macro backdrop: consumption still too small

Despite years of exhortation to rebalance, household consumption remains structurally low by international standards—about 37% of GDP in 2022, compared with an upper‑middle‑income average of roughly 45.5%.  That gap is not only about social insurance and hukou; it is also about how policy has reallocated street‑level value added away from high‑turnover micro‑retail.

The policy mechanics of dampened demand

1) Friction at the point of sale.

By extinguishing kerbside retail, cities increased the “distance” between impulse and purchase. Uniform signs and mall corridors may be neat, but they reduce serendipity and discovery—the small jolts that turn window‑shopping into spending. Shanghai’s 2019–20 signage crackdowns illustrate how aesthetic centralization can homogenize retail variety, even as more nuanced rules have since tried to reverse that sameness. 

2) Forced format shift.

Redirecting vendors into malls and managed marketplaces raises fixed costs (rents, service charges, decoration standards), consolidates bargaining power in landlords’ hands, and displaces owner‑operators who once relied on minimal capital and proximity to foot traffic. The closures and relocations of major Beijing markets (Dahongmen, Zoo) are canonical examples of such “format hardening.” 

3) A labor squeeze.

The eviction of “low‑end” workers—delivery riders’ families, cooks, cleaners—removed both supply (cheap services) and demand (their own local spending), creating a double drag on neighborhood cash flow. 

 From cash on the kerb to cash in claims: the “yansehu” rent‑sink

When businesses move from sidewalks to malls, a larger slice of each yuan spent becomes rent or related property income. In China, as elsewhere, higher‑income households and corporate landlords have lower marginal propensities to consume (MPC) than street vendors and low‑tier workers. IMF work shows that since 2020 the rise in savings was especially pronounced among higher‑income groups, while micro evidence and recent scholarship confirm MPC falls with income and wealth—meaning each extra yuan accruing to richer owners generates less immediate consumption than the same yuan in a hawker’s till. 

Shift the income split from stallholders (high‑MPC, cash‑spending households) to mall landlords (low‑MPC, debt‑servicing entities), and the velocity of consumer cash falls. That helps explain why “orderly” retail formats can coexist with anemic aggregate demand.

The effect is amplified by the property cycle. With property investment down 10.6% in 2024 and continuing to fall this year (‑11% to ‑13% y/y depending on month), developers and LGFVs prioritize deleveraging and interest payments over spending. As demand softens, new starts tumble (about ‑23% in 2024), and landlords lean harder on rent extraction from existing assets—again routing income to low‑MPC pockets. 

The distributional channel matters. China’s wealth has concentrated at the top, and recent reporting suggests growing concentration even within the rich—a pattern consistent with lower aggregate MPC. (WID and other datasets show long‑run increases in top shares; Hurun’s 2025 readout highlights more wealth clustering among elite households.) 

The feedback loop: weaker spending, less building, wider gaps

Clamp down on informal commerce → push activity into high‑rent formats → direct larger shares of retail value to low‑MPC recipients → subdue consumption growth. With consumer demand tepid, retail developers cancel or delay projects; new construction shrinks; household wealth tied to property looks riskier, reinforcing caution and savings. This loop is visible in the ongoing slump in property sales, investment and starts. 

Meanwhile, consumers pay more for basics when street competition disappears. The measured 4.7% bump in fruit‑and‑veg prices after vendor evictions is small individually but large in aggregate, especially for lower‑income households with high budget shares in food. 

Policy pivots that would raise consumption rather than merely rearranging it

  1. Legalize, don’t just tolerate, street vending.
    Cities have already experimented—Shenzhen’s designated vending areas and the “night economy” pilot loosened blanket bans. Scale this with micro‑permits, health training, and “clean‑stall” design codes, not blanket prohibition.  
  2. Decompress the cost stack for the smallest firms.
    Exempt sub‑10‑employee retailers from uniform signage mandates; allow one additional exterior sign if it displays prices or menus; lighten fit‑out standards for kiosks. (Shanghai has already moved away from one‑size‑fits‑all signs—codify that pragmatism.)  
  3. Cap and share rents in managed markets.
    Set graduated rent caps in government‑backed markets, and link tenancy to revenue‑sharing instead of fixed charges so landlords have skin in the game. Encourage public‑interest REIT pilots that return a sliver of market cash flows to stall‑holders via rebates when turnover dips, minimizing the “rent sink” effect.
  4. Restore proximity.
    Reverse relocations that severed daily‑life commerce (produce, tailoring, phone repair) from residential demand. The national “urban renewal” drive already instructs cities to avoid large‑scale demolition and favor micro‑renovation; use that to reinstate ground‑floor retail where safe.  
  5. Target the MPC margin.
    Boost consumption where it responds: expand portable social insurance for migrants; allow schooling access tied to actual residence; cut employee social‑security contributions for micro‑firms. IMF analysis and micro evidence agree: high‑income cohorts saved more post‑2020; push incremental income toward lower‑ and middle‑income households with higher MPC.  
  6. Measure what matters.
    Publish granular indicators for street‑level retail diversity and stall turnover alongside headline retail sales. If prices for fresh produce climb where vendors vanish, that’s a policy‑relevant signal.  

Bottom line

China’s consumer shortfall is not just about macro levers. It is also a spatial and institutional story: tidy streets and uniform storefronts reduce frictionless buying; relocating commerce into malls shifts income toward low‑MPC rent recipients; evicting low‑tier workers removes both supply and demand. Re‑legalizing the messy, inexpensive, high‑turnover edge of the city would not only make neighborhoods livelier; it would raise the share of each yuan that returns to spending rather than pooling in balance‑sheet reservoirs—your “yansehu”—that do little for demand.

Sources (selected)

  • Beijing “holes‑in‑the‑wall” plan (c. 16,000 closures): Caixin.  
  • Wholesale market closures/relocations (Zoo, Dahongmen → Hebei/Tianjin): Xinhua/China Daily.  
  • Street‑vendor evictions raise produce prices (~4.7%): Cities (Sun & Zhu, 2022).  
  • Shanghai signboard unification (“bald chickens”) and subsequent relaxation: Sixth Tone.  
  • Menghua Street Wonton reopening with Premier’s support: State Council (english.gov.cn).  
  • Household consumption share (China vs. UMIC average): World Bank, China Economic Update (Dec 2023).  
  • Property slump (investment, sales, new starts): Reuters tallies from NBS.  
  • High‑income savings/MPC heterogeneity: IMF; academic micro evidence.  
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China’s Infrastructure Maintenance Challenges and the Urgent Need for Upgrades

China, renowned for its rapid economic growth and extensive infrastructure development, faces significant challenges in maintaining its infrastructure and upgrading facilities to meet current building codes. Despite the country’s impressive achievements in constructing roads, railways, and urban developments, the quality and sustainability of these projects have come under increasing scrutiny.

One of the critical issues is the heavy reliance on government-led infrastructure development, which has resulted in a single-source financing model. This model has significantly increased government debt, rendering it unsustainable in the long run. For years, China’s infrastructure financing primarily derived from government lending and land-transfer revenues. However, as these revenues have diminished, local governments now face high levels of solvency pressures and risks.

Moreover, the quality of infrastructure being built has been a concern. While China has invested heavily in infrastructure projects to generate growth and modernize its economy, many of these projects were approved without thorough consideration of their necessity and quality. This has led to the phenomenon of “ghost cities,” where infrastructure and urban development have drastically outpaced demand, leaving millions of apartments and offices empty.

A significant area of concern is the cold chain logistics infrastructure. Cold chain logistics, which is crucial for the transportation and storage of perishable goods, faces severe challenges due to outdated infrastructure materials that do not meet current fire codes. Many cold storage facilities use high Global Warming Potential (GWP) refrigerants, which are not only environmentally harmful but also pose safety risks due to their flammability. The use of such refrigerants is being phased out globally, with new regulations set to restrict their use further.

Moreover, cold chain logistics warehouses’ insulation materials, if chosen improperly, are prone to fire. For example, in December 2024, a fire at a cold storage facility in Rongcheng, Shandong Province, resulted in the deaths of nine individuals. The fire was caused by thermal insulation materials that caught on fire at the under-construction cold chain storage facility. This incident highlights the critical need for proper insulation materials that meet fire safety standards.

The lack of spending on upgrading these facilities to meet modern safety and environmental standards exacerbates the problem. The government’s focus on new construction projects has often overshadowed the need for maintenance and upgrades of existing infrastructure. This neglect has led to a situation where many cold storage facilities are not only unsafe but also inefficient, contributing to higher operational costs and environmental damage.

In addition to cold chain logistics, there have been several notable incidents of poorly maintained infrastructure in China. In July 2023, the roof of the gymnasium at Qiqihar No. 34 Middle School in Heilongjiang Province collapsed, resulting in the deaths of 11 students and teachers. The collapse was caused by the improper storage of insulation materials on the roof, which absorbed rainwater and increased the load. In April 2022, a residential building in Changsha, Hunan Province, collapsed, killing 54 people and injuring 9. The building had been illegally expanded and its structural integrity was compromised. In August 2020, the Juxian Hotel in Linfen, Shanxi Province, collapsed, resulting in 29 deaths and 28 injuries. The building had been illegally constructed and expanded without proper design and construction standards.

The economic impact of poorly maintained infrastructure is significant. China’s infrastructure investment, which once contributed to rapid economic growth, is now facing diminishing returns. In 2021, China spent 4.8% of its GDP on inland transport infrastructure, a substantial amount compared to other countries. However, over half of these investments have destroyed rather than generated economic value. The poor quality of infrastructure projects has led to increased local government debt and reduced economic efficiency. For instance, many high-speed rail lines operate at a loss and contribute to local government debt. The economic burden of maintaining and upgrading substandard infrastructure is substantial, diverting resources from other critical areas of development.

To address these challenges, China needs to adopt a more sustainable infrastructure development model. This includes shifting away from dependence on government financing to greater reliance on market finance. The central government is advocating for diversified ownership by encouraging social investment in infrastructure operations through franchises, equity investment, and public-private partnerships (PPP). Successful examples of PPP model projects worldwide demonstrate the potential benefits of this approach. For instance, the London Underground in the UK was upgraded and maintained using the PPP model, resulting in improved service reliability and efficiency. Similarly, the Gautrain Rapid Rail Link in South Africa connected Johannesburg, Pretoria, and the OR Tambo International Airport, significantly reducing travel time and congestion. In Australia, the Sydney Desalination Plant provided a reliable water supply to Sydney, ensuring water security during drought periods. Additionally, the São Paulo Metro Line 4 in Brazil expanded the metro system in São Paulo, improving public transportation and reducing traffic congestion.

In conclusion, while China has made remarkable strides in infrastructure development, the country must address the maintenance and upgrading of existing facilities, particularly in the cold chain logistics sector, to ensure long-term sustainability and safety. By adopting a more diversified and sustainable financing model and prioritizing the quality and necessity of infrastructure projects, China can continue to build a robust and resilient infrastructure network that meets current and future needs.

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Navigating the Future: Addressing China’s Economic Challenges

China, a nation with a rich history and a rapidly evolving economy, faces a myriad of challenges as it strides towards the future. Among these, the issue of population decline looms large. With a shrinking workforce and an aging population, the country finds itself in a demographic conundrum. Additionally, China is grappling with the need to balance technological advancements with traditional industries, the transformation of consumer behavior due to centralized online platforms, housing stability, over-reliance on State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), talent loss, and the challenges posed by an aging population. Addressing these issues requires a multifaceted approach that includes policy reforms, incentives, and strategic investments.

One of the most pressing issues is the population decline. China’s population has been shrinking for the second consecutive year. In 2023, the National Bureau of Statistics reported just 9.02 million births, which is only half as many as in 2017. This decline, coupled with 11.1 million deaths in 2023, resulted in a population decrease of 2.08 million for the year. The trend is accelerating, with projections from the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences indicating that China’s population could shrink from its current 1.4 billion to just 525 million by 2100. The working-age population is also expected to decline significantly, falling to just 210 million by 2100, which is only one-fifth of its peak in 2014. The total fertility rate, which measures the average number of births per woman, has dropped from 1.66 between 1991 and 2017 to around 1 in recent years, far below the level of 2.1 generally thought necessary to sustain a population.

To address the issue of population decline, China could implement monetary incentives and public funding for schools and pre-school institutions such as day-care and kindergarten. The government should allocate more resources to ensure educational equity, ensuring that high-standard educational resources are accessible to all. Investing in virtual learning platforms and continuing education for teachers can help achieve this goal. For instance, virtual learning platforms have proven to be effective in higher education by providing flexibility, accessibility, and personalized learning experiences. Studies have shown that online learning platforms can enhance student performance and satisfaction by offering self-paced learning, interactive content, and robust support services. However, challenges such as the lack of face-to-face interactions and the need for self-discipline must be addressed to maximize their efficacy.

In response to these demographic shifts, China has turned its focus towards new productivity tools. The development of artificial intelligence, advanced chips, new materials, and innovative medicines are at the forefront of this technological push. However, this relentless pursuit of innovation often leaves traditional industries struggling to keep pace with rapid advancements. The challenge lies in balancing the old with the new, ensuring that progress does not come at the expense of established sectors. This issue could be greatly mitigated if China incentivizes companies to transform themselves rather than relying on centralized development.

The rise of centralized online platforms has further transformed the economic landscape. These digital giants have revolutionized consumer behavior, drawing shoppers away from brick-and-mortar stores and into the virtual marketplace. While this shift has spurred growth in the tech sector, it has also led to the decline of traditional retail, posing a significant challenge for local businesses. Chinese major cities have been pushing to eliminate brick-and-mortar stores in city centers through policies like land reallocation and complicated executive processes. This has led to the hollowing out of city centers and the decentralization of the population. The unexpected consequence of these policies has been lower consumption, as the population is now further from malls and shops. To alleviate this problem, cities could implement concrete policies like government shopping coupons to stimulate consumer spending and boost the local economy.

Housing stability remains a critical issue for China. The government has recognized the need for more public housing projects, drawing inspiration from Singapore’s successful model. By investing in affordable housing, China aims to provide its citizens with a stable living environment, fostering social harmony and economic stability. However, the country faces significant challenges with unfinished projects and ensuring housing delivery. In 2024, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development reported that 338 million housing units had been delivered nationwide, highlighting the importance of ensuring housing delivery in restoring industry confidence. The overdevelopment of land and the oversupply of real estate have exacerbated the situation, leading to a glut of unsold properties. To address these issues, public housing projects should focus on build-for-rent developments in major city centers and industrial hubs to facilitate population movement and lower housing costs for the young population. By doing so, the public housing market can boost talent confidence in China and support economic growth. Additionally, housing stability could be further enhanced by lowering interest rates and providing government incentives for young talents to buy their first home.

Another pressing concern is China’s over-reliance on State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). These entities, while instrumental in the country’s economic development, often suffer from low productivity and a lack of creativity. Unlike Singapore, where SOEs function more like investment engines, China’s SOEs are often bogged down by bureaucratic inefficiencies. For example, Temasek Holdings, a state holding company in Singapore, has successfully managed investments in various sectors, contributing significantly to the country’s GDP growth. Similarly, Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) has been a key driver of the Kingdom’s Vision 2030, investing in diverse sectors such as automotive, utilities, and renewables to promote economic growth and reduce reliance on oil. Reforming China’s SOEs to enhance their efficiency and innovation is crucial for sustained economic growth. Additionally, many of China’s SOEs are caught in a debt trap, with 90% of the bottom SOEs by revenue having to borrow more to repay existing loans. This creates an invisible debt problem that requires external intervention. To address this, SOEs should act as investment engines that promote GDP growth in local areas instead of over-relying on property sales.

The issue of involution is another significant challenge facing Chinese companies. This phenomenon, characterized by intense competition that fails to generate proportional returns, has resulted in constantly negative Producer Price Index (PPI) and lower Consumer Price Index (CPI). The problem is partly caused by over-supply on the producer side and a lack of innovative products that have a technical competitive edge on the global market. To address this issue, local governments should use SOEs or incentive investment funds to inject funding into companies that continually innovate or have the prospect of providing industry-leading solutions. This problem also reflects flaws in the government performance appraisal system. The laid-back status of the government in regard to helping local industry is reflective of the government’s operation model, where the moderation (Zhongyong) culture makes changes difficult to implement.

Moreover, The issue of talent loss to other major economies cannot be ignored. China’s emphasis on stability over growth and creativity has led many of its brightest minds to seek opportunities abroad. To stem this brain drain, China must create an environment that not only values stability but also encourages innovation and entrepreneurial spirit. Providing tax incentives and other benefits to talents working in certain industries could help retain and attract skilled professionals. For example, the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area (GBA) offers an income tax subsidy for foreign talent, which has been restarted in 2023/24 after a one-year hiatus. Additionally, China has extended individual income tax benefits for foreigners, such as on rental and education expenses, till the end of 2027. These measures aim to make China a more attractive destination for top talent.

China’s aging population is another significant challenge. In 2020, about 17.9 percent of the population in China was aged 60 and older. This share is growing rapidly and is estimated to reach 40 percent by 2050. The number of people aged 60 and above nearly doubled between 2000 and 2020, reaching around 255 million. This trend is even more pronounced for the age group of 80 and above, which nearly tripled and is expected to reach roughly 132 million by 2050, up from only 32 million in 2020. The old-age dependency ratio, which denotes the relation of the old-age population to the working-age population, is estimated to grow from 18.2 percent in 2020 to more than 50 percent by 2050. In response, the government needs to incentivize the development of gray-hair industries, such as nursery homes and house refits for older residents. The central government has been attaching increasing importance to the “gray-hair economy” in recent years by encouraging the development of community services, including elderly home care, meal delivery, and cleaning services. This sector provides products and services for the elderly population, which is rapidly growing. By supporting these industries, the government can ensure that the needs of the aging population are met, while also injecting new vitality into the economy.

The Chinese population faces several problems that contribute to a higher savings rate compared to other developed economies. High medical costs, particularly for cancer and other conditions, place a significant financial burden on patients. For instance, the average cost for treatments of lung cancer in China stood at around 39,500 yuan in 2021. Additionally, there is a lack of high-quality doctors and nurses, which relies heavily on higher education resources. The shortage of healthcare professionals is acute, with China having only 0.43 pediatricians for every 1000 children in 2012 and 0.14 general practitioners for every 1000 population in 2015. The turnover rate of nurses was roughly 10%-11% in 2015, and the turnover intention of nurses reached 57%. Moreover, the problem of generic drugs being much less effective than the original brand medication has lowered public trust in the efficacy of the medical industry. The effectiveness of some generics has yet to be thoroughly validated, leading to uncertain treatment outcomes. To address these issues, China needs to provide higher social security medical cost coverage and cover losses for the major population whenever banks or large institutions fail. By doing so, the country can reduce the financial burden on its citizens and encourage a more balanced approach to savings and spending.

In conclusion, the Chinese economy stands at a crossroads, grappling with demographic challenges, technological advancements, and the need for structural reforms. By addressing these issues with a balanced and forward-thinking approach, China can navigate its way towards a prosperous and sustainable future. Implementing monetary incentives for population growth, investing in education, incentivizing company transformation, stimulating consumer spending, ensuring housing stability, reforming SOEs, addressing the involution problem, retaining talent, and supporting the aging population are all crucial steps. With these measures, China can overcome its current challenges and build a resilient and thriving economy for the future.